link: Soto v. Great America, LLC, 2017-cv-6902 (N.D. Ill., May 24, 2018)
Plaintiff Hugo Soto, represented by Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, filed a class action in Lake County, Illinois state court against Great America under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act as Amended by the Fair and Accurate Transactions Act of 2003, which prohibits printing more than the last five digits of a credit or debit card number on an electronically printed receipt.
Defendant removed the case to federal court and then Plaintiffs moved for a remand to state court on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction because the damages alleged do not meet the federal standing requirements imposed by Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
Judge Robert M. Dow agreed with Plaintiff’s reliance on Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016), where the Seventh Circuit addressed the application of these standing principles to FACTA claims. The Seventh Circuit in Meyers held that plaintiffs alleging only bare procedural violations of FACTA lack Article III standing because they have not suffered an injury-in-fact. 843 F.3d at 727-28 (plaintiff lacked standing because his claim that restaurant failed to truncate a payment card’s expiration date did not allege actual harm and thus was insufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement).
Defendant argued the remand would be futile because the state court would lack jurisdiction to hear the case for the very same reason, relying on Porch-Clark v. Engelhart, 930 F. Supp. 2d 928, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The court rejected this argument and found that remand was still warranted because the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their FACTA claim in state court depends on an interpretation of state standing law, and that “it is not clear that the Illinois injury-in-fact requirement is identical to its federal analogue.”
Plaintiffs’ motion also requested attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), but the court denied that request and found that the defendant could have reasonably believed it would be able to distinguish Meyers given the damages alleged in the complaint.