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Tag: 1692e

Collector’s Reference to Faith in Debtor No FDCPA Claim

Steven Uhrich

Link: Larkin v. FINANCE SYSTEM OF GREEN BAY INC. (E.D. Wisc. Nov. 8 2018).

Plaintiff filed an FDCPA 1692e claim based on a collection letter that contained the following:


You do not want to lose our confidence. You want to be worthy of the faith put in you by your creditor; yet the above past due account remains unpaid, possibly through an oversight on your part.
Please contact your creditor or our office to make arrangements for payment on the above account. We are interested in you preserving a good credit rating with the above creditor.

The Court Disagreed:

Larkin alleges that the unsophisticated consumer would be misled by the letter to believe that FSGB “has confidence” in her and that the creditor, Green Bay Radiology, “has faith” in her that she would lose if she did not pay her debt. But these statements are obviously true. Unless a radiologist is providing services for free, he or she no doubt trusts, i.e., has faith, that the person served will pay. Likewise, debt collectors likely have some confidence that many people, when provided notice of an outstanding debt, will pay if they are able. Otherwise, why make the effort? Larkin’s assertion that these innocuous statements imply that nonpayment will harm the physician-patient relationship is bizarre and idiosyncratic.

Demanding “Pre-Purchase” Interest Not Valid Under FDCPA

Steven Uhrich

Link: Gomez V. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, Case No. 14-cv-09420 (N.D. Ill Sept. 24, 2018).

Plaintiffs had Bank of America (“BOA”) credit cards that were delinquent and charged off in 2009. BOA did not compute or track interest on an account after it was charged off. BOA also did not send regular billing statements to holders of charged-off accounts. Two years after BOA charged off Plaintiffs’ account, BOA sold the account to Cavalry SPV, which immediately assigned it to Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC for servicing and collection.

Plaintiffs, through his counsel Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, filed a class action lawsuit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act alleging that defendants computed and added post-charge-off, pre-purchase interest to the account—basically, that it added two years’ worth of interest that BOA had not computed or tracked while it held the debt.  Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated the FDCPA by adding interest to credit card debts after the assignor bank had waived that interest. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs argued that (1) BOA waived its right to collect post-charge-off, pre-sale interest, (2) this waiver barred Defendants from imposing post-charge-off, pre-sale interest, and (3) Cavalry violated the FDCPA by adding post-charge-off, pre-sale interest, thereby misrepresenting the amount Plaintiff owed.

Defendants argued that (1) Cavalry SPV is not a debt collector, (2) Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) the response letter is not a collection communication.

Judge Andrea R. Wood entered summary judgment in favor of defendant because it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations period for FDCPA claims. The court also held, somewhat ironically, that Defendant waived its argument regarding choice-of-law analysis as to the waiver issue (Defendant didn’t want Illinois law to apply). Under that analysis, judge Wood found that:

the fact that BOA chose not to charge interest for two years (and it consciously made that decision as part of a broader policy) indicates that it intended to waive its right to collect this post-charge-off interest retroactively. BOA’s implied waiver of the right to charge interest on Plaintiffs’ account retroactively is further evidenced by the fact that BOA did not send periodic account statements to Plaintiffs.

It thus appears the merits of the suit would likely have supported summary judgment had the statute of limitations been met.

 

Mistaken ID FDCPA Claim Survives Summary Judgment

Steven Uhrich

Link 1: (SHA Opinion) Ali v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-06178 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018);
Link 2: (SAA Opinion) Ali v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-06178 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018).

These two consolidated cases derive from PRA’s attempt to collect different debts from the wrong Syed H. Ali and from his father Syed A. Ali. The suit alleges that PRA unsuccessfully sought to collect a debt from a person named SHA located in Texas, and then went after a different SHA—one of the plaintiffs here. PRA sent collection letters and then filed a lawsuit through the defendant attorneys. The underlying error here is defendants sought collection against the Debtor and served the collections complaint at an address where another person bearing the same name (including middle initial) lived.

Plaintiff, represented by  Bryan Thompson and Robert Harrer of the Chicago Consumer Law Center, P.C., Daniel Brown, of Main Street Attorney, LLC, Blaise & Nitschke, P.C. & The Law Office of M. Kris Kasalo, Ltd., filed a 9-count complaint.

Opinion 1

The court (Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman) issued two opinions: one for the minor SHA and one for the father SAA. As to SHA, the court found that factual issues abound as to whether this was a consumer debt (thus falling within the FDCPA) and also regarding the Bona Fide Error defense that Defendants asserted. However the court granted summary judgment as to the 1692d and 1692f claims finding that there wasn’t harassing or unfair or unconscionable means used in the attempted debt collections.

The claim under the Illinois Collection Agency Act (“ICAA”), 225 ILCS 425/1 et seq. failed because the court found that the ICAA did not intend to give consumers a private right of action and dismissed it sua sponte under Rule 12(h)(3):

SHA cites Sherman as authority for his implied right of private action. Sherman v. Field Clinic, 74 Ill. App. 3d 21, 392 N.E. 2d 154 (1st Dist. 1979). Since Sherman was decided nearly 40 years ago this district and even Illinois state courts have been split on whether to follow it . . .  If the legislature intended for there to be an implied right of action, it would have written it into the law itself, especially considering the lapse in time since Sherman was decided, implying this right.

Opinion 2

The second (SAA) opinion  addressed additional claims by SAA against Blitt & Gaines, P.C. and Freedman Anselmo Lindberg Oliver, LLC (which have since merged). The additional counts were brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The court dismissed the 1692d claim on the basis that there was no evidence that the collection attorneys knew they had they wrong man, but allwed the 1692e claim against PRA to survive despite the Bona Fide Error defense:

The Section 1692e FDCPA violations against Portfolio stem from its alleged failure to confirm the account Debtor’s personal information and recognize that it differed from SAA’s information before pursuing collections and the lawsuit. This Court finds that there is a question of fact whether a reasonable, unsophisticated consumer would be misled by Portfolio’s actions. SAA was upset and confused by the letters and the lawsuit against “Syed Ali.” Indeed, mistakenly being sent a demand letter or being served with a lawsuit in one’s name, taken in isolation, could be confusing[. . .]

This Court [. . .] finds an issue of fact as to the sufficiency of Portfolio’s controls and procedures since Portfolio was on notice from the August 29, 2014 TransUnion report, prior to its filing of the lawsuit against Syed Ali, that another Syed Ali lived at the address associated with the Debtor.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the debt collector attorneys based on their bona fide error defense, noting that they don’t have to apply “most comprehensive approach to avoid errors. Courts have found it sufficient for defendants to take reasonable efforts to avoid violations if FDCPA.”

As to the impermissible pull claim under the FCRA, the court sided with PRA in that the CRA was the entity responsible for the pull on the incorrect address and the subsequent pulls were related to accounts that the correct SAA had with Portfolio.

 

In Rem Demand for Neighborhood Association Debt Violates FDCPA

Steven Uhrich

Link: Ellison v. Fullett Rosenlund Anderson PC, Case No. 17 CV 2236 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 28, 2018).

Defendant law firm sent a notice on behalf of Brookside Village Neighborhood Association to collect past due monthly assessments. Plaintiff had discharged the debt in bankruptcy. Regardless, Defendant sent a dunning letter titled “IN REM NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR POSSESSION” that stated:

THIS IS THE PROPERTY’S NOTICE … that the property is in default of its ongoing obligation due to Brookside Village Neighborhood Association in the sum of $4,100.00 for its proportionate share of the expenses … lawfully agreed upon due and owing at least in part since 02/01/2011, as well as the sum of $265.02 in legal fees and costs in attempting to collect this account, for a total sum of $4,365.02.

This is its NOTICE that payment in full of the amount stated above is demanded of the property and that, unless its payment of the FULL AMOUNT is made on or before the expiration of thirty-four (34) days after the date of mailing of this Notice, THE ASSOCIATION MAY SEEK TO TERMINATE ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES.

The court, judge Harry D. Leinenweber, found that Plaintiff is a “consumer” despite having discharged the debt, that the notice was in connection with the collection of a debt (despite Defendant’s arguments it was only “in rem”), and that the notice taken as a whole would be misleading and confusing on its face to the average unsophisticated consumer.

Defendant’s hail mary argument that the FDCPA conflicts with Illinois’ Forcible Entry and Detainer Act was summarily rejected:

FRA fails to identify any conflict, let alone one that rises to the magnitude of conflict present in Ho, between FEDA and the FDCPA. Nor can the Court find any such conflicts. While fulfilling FEDA requirements, a notice or letter can still be drafted in a way that violates the FDCPA. This happens to be the case for the Notice here. Regardless of whether the Notice complies with FEDA requirements, the Court finds that the Notice was misleading and could have been crafted in a way to avoid ambiguity and confusion, particularly by informing Plaintiff either that she was not liable for the debt or by specifying the amount, if any, she was still liable for post-bankruptcy discharge.

Plaintiff was represented by Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

Debt Collector Demand for Interest Violates FDCPA

Steven Uhrich

Link: Knepp v. Huffman, Case No. 3:17-CV-282-JD (N.D. Ind., Sept. 28, 2018).

Summary judgment entered by judge Jon E. DeGuilio for plaintiff where debt collector demanded 8% interest despite no statutory authority to do so:

Martin Financial has not pointed the Court to any authority standing for the proposition that Indiana Code § 24-4.6-1-103 allows a debt collector to collect interest on an unpaid debt; where, as here, the debt collector has not produced a contract that provides for the imposition of interest in the first place, or any other evidence that an 8% interest rate would apply [. . .]

Because Martin Financial failed to identify any applicable Indiana statute permitting it to charge interest on Ms. Knepp’s debt, it effectively admitted (through waiver) that the dunning letters falsely imply a possible outcome that cannot legally come to pass.

 

Consumer Lawyer May Be Sanctioned For Omitting Controlling Authority

Steven Uhrich

Link: Taylor v. Client Services, Case No. 17-cv-05704 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 9, 2018)

I previously posted about the case brought by Michael Wood and Community Lawyers Group, Ltd. (“CLG”) where Judge Wood dismissed an FDCPA claim based on two consecutive letters sent by a debt collector: Bass v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, (N.D. Ill., Aug. 22, 2018). In that case, the court declined to issue sanctions under 28 U.S.C § 1927 against the Plaintiff’s lawyer.

In Taylor, another case brought by the same law firm based on the same theories (1692e and f), judge John J. Tharp, Jr. ordered that Michael Wood and CLG show cause why they should not be sanctioned for a deliberate failure to disclose adverse controlling authority to the court.

The court noted that CLG must have realized in the Bass case during briefing that the case of  Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) was controlling. In that case the Seventh Circuit crafted the the safe harbor language allowing the debt collector to say it is “not obligated to renew this offer.”

The court referenced Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)2) which provides that “A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel,” and the implicit certification require by Rule 11 tha the claim is “warranted by existing law.”

To be clear, under Rule 11 a lawyer may argue that “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” But the brief filed by CLG didn’t make any argument that Evory was wrongly decided or should be overturned: it didn’t even mention it.

We’ll see what happens after the parties respond to the court’s order.

Briefs on the motion to dismiss:

2017-09-21 Def’s M2D

2017-11-09 Plaintiff’s Response to D’s M2D

 

FDCPA Letter Claim Dismissed in Part under 1692e(5)

Steven Uhrich

 

Link: Cadiz, v. CREDENCE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, 17-cv-1949 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 24, 2018)

Judge Andrea R. Wood granted in part and denied in part a debt-collector’s motion to dismiss a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act alleging that the following language violated 15 U.S.C. 1692(e):

The above listed account owing to AT&T Mobility has been assigned to Credence Resource Management, LLC for collections. This account is currently delinquent and due in full. We would like to resolve this matter amicably, therefore please send your payment for the above amount. . . .

Plaintiff alleged the above language violated § 1692e of the FDCPA by threatening the possibility of a lawsuit when Credence did not actually intend to take any legal action.

The court allowed the general e and (e)10 claim to proceed, but dismissed the e(5) claim.

Credence’s statements are not clearly misleading. But the Court cannot say that they in no way could be interpreted as misleading to the unsophisticated consumer. Rather, the letter is properly categorized as the second type of claim—for it is plausible that the use of the word “amicably” could mislead the unsophisticated consumer into believing that litigation was a possibility if the debt were left unresolved. See McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that the use of the phrase “offer to settle” in a collection letter seeking payment of a time-barred debt could mislead the unsophisticated consumer to believe that the debt was legally enforceable, even though the possibility of legal action was not mentioned in the letter.)

The court drew a strong distinction between the letter’s language above and the language in the letter in the case of  Clark v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 247, 251 (N.D. Ill. 1999), where the letter said:

The [American Medical Collection Agency] has been authorized to take appropriate legal measures to obtain payment.” and “[T]his is your final opportunity to settle your account without incurring additional problems.

 

§ 1692e: Bass v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Dist. Court, N.D. Ill. 2018

Steven Uhrich

 

Link: Bass v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, (N.D. Ill., Aug. 22, 2018)

PRA, a debt collector, sent two letters to the debtor offering to settle the debt at a discounted amount that stated “[w]e are not obligated to renew this offer.” PRA’s second letter contained essentially the same settlement offer as its first letter but with a later deadline. The debtor claimed this language violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act which forbids debt collectors from threatening to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken or using of any false representation or deceptive means to attempt to collect any debt.

Judge Andrea R. Wood rejected this argument, finding that a debt collector repeating the same settlement offer while also clearly indicating that it is not obligated to renew the offer does not remove it from the safe harbor language the Seventh Circuit espoused in Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). There, the court reasoned that “[t]he word `obligated’ [was] strong and even the unsophisticated consumer [would] realize that there [was] a renewal possibility but that it [was] not assured.” Id.

As for the § 1692f claim, the court held that to allow his claim under § 1692f to proceed based on the same conduct that falls within the § 1692e safe harbor would undermine the Seventh Circuit’s solution in Evory. The court briefly addressed PRA’s motion for the Plaintiff to pay its fees under 28 U.S.C § 1927 and concluded the conduct by Bass’s counsel did not reach the level of being unreasonable and vexatious to justify a sanction of fees.