In Long, The Third Circuit issued a similar opinion on standing where the plaintiff alleged that the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority failed to (1) give job applicants a copy of the credit report they relied upon in taking an adverse action against them and (2) send them the appropriate notices required under § 1681b(b)(3) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The case was argued by Deepak Gupta and an amicus brief was filed by Francis & Mailman.
The court found that plaintiffs met Article III standing requirements espoused in Spokeo in regards to the credit reports, but not for the notices. The court applied the two-part test from Spokeo, asking whether Congress intended to grant redress for the particular injury alleged and whether the injury in question has a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized under common law.
As to the claim for failing to give a copy of the report, the court pointed out the unambiguous language in the FCRA creating a right of action and said this about the historical analysis:
Common-law privacy rights were historically understood as being invaded by “(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, . . . (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, . . . (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, . . . or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public . . . .” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2)(a)-(d) (1977). These latter three types of privacy torts represent interference with an individual’s ability to control his personal information. That is analogous to the injury here, which is the use of Plaintiffs’ personal information—their consumer reports—without Plaintiffs being able to see or respond to it.
The Third Circuit called out the Robertson case, saying “[t]he Seventh Circuit concluded, as do we, that a plaintiff has standing to sue based on allegations that she did not receive the pre-adverse action notice required by § 1681b(b)(3).”
As to the claim regarding the notice requirements, the court found it was a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, that cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. “Plaintiffs became aware of their FCRA rights and were able to file this lawsuit within the prescribed limitations period, so they were not injured … Plaintiffs are similar to Groshek, and like him, they lack standing, because although they did not receive FCRA rights disclosures, they understood their rights sufficiently to be able to bring this lawsuit.”